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Abstract On the basis of the IPCC B2, A1b and B1 baseline scenarios, mitigation scenarios
were developed that stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations at 650, 550 and 450 and –
subject to specific assumptions – 400 ppm CO2-eq. The analysis takes into account a large
number of reduction options, such as reductions of non-CO2 gases, carbon plantations and
measures in the energy system. The study shows stabilization as low as 450 ppm CO2-eq. to
be technically feasible, even given relatively high baseline scenarios. To achieve these lower
concentration levels, global emissions need to peak within the first two decades. The net
present value of abatement costs for the B2 baseline scenario (a medium scenario) increases
from 0.2% of cumulative GDP to 1.1% as the shift is made from 650 to 450 ppm. On the other
hand, the probability of meeting a two-degree target increases from 0% –10% to 20% –70%.
The mitigation scenarios lead to lower emissions of regional air pollutants but also to
increased land use. The uncertainty in the cost estimates is at least in the order of 50%, with
the most important uncertainties including land-use emissions, the potential for bio-energy
and the contribution of energy efficiency. Furthermore, creating the right socio-economic and
political conditions for mitigation is more important than any of the technical constraints.
1 Introduction
Climate change appears to be among the most prominent sustainability problems of this
century. IPCC’s Third Assessment Report concludes that earth’s climate system has demon-
strably changed since the pre-industrial era and that – without climate policy responses –
changes in the global climate are likely to become much larger, with expected increases in
global temperature in the 2000 – 2100 period ranging from 1.4 to 5.8 °C (IPCC 2001).
Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) states
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as its ultimate objective: “Stabilization of greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system.”However, what constitutes a non-dangerous level is an open question, as this
depends on all kinds of uncertainties in the cause-effect chain of climate change and on
political decisions about the risks to be avoided. Some of the recent literature suggests that
climate risks could already be substantial for an increase of 1–3 °C compared to pre-industrial
levels (see Corfee et al 2005; ECF and PIK 2004; Leemans and Eickhout 2004; Mastandrea
and Schneider 2004; MNP 2005; O`Neill and Oppenheimer 2002). As one of the political
actors, the EU has adopted the climate policy goal of limiting the temperature increase to a
maximum of 2 °C compared to pre-industrial levels (EU 1996, 2005). However,
uncertainties still allow for other interpretations of what constitutes dangerous climate
change in the context Article 2. Actors may, in their interpretation, weigh factors like the
risks of climate change adaptation costs and limits and the costs and effectiveness of
mitigation action.
Apart from the temperature target, the required level of emission reduction also depends
on the uncertain relationship between atmospheric GHG concentrations and temperature
increase, in other words ‘climate sensitivity’. Several probability-distribution functions (PDF)
for climate sensitivity have been published in recent years, each indicating a broad range of
values for climate sensitivity that still have a reasonable likelihood (for example Murphy
2004; Wigley and Raper 2001). Several authors indicated that these PDFs can be translated
into a risk approach towards climate change (Azar and Rodhe 1997; den Elzen and
Meinshausen 2005; Hare and Meinshausen 2004; Meinshausen 2006; Richels et al. 2004;
Yohe et al. 2004). These studies show that a high degree of certainty in terms of achieving a
2 °C temperature target is likely to require stabilization at low GHG concentration (for
instance a probability greater than 50% requires stabilization at least below 450 ppm CO2-
eq.1). The stabilization of GHG concentrations at such a low level will require drastic
emission reductions compared to the likely course of emissions in the absence of climate
policies. Even for more modest concentration targets such as 650 ppm CO2-eq., emissions
in 2100 will generally need to be reduced by about 50% compared to probable levels in the
absence of a climate policy (IPCC 2001).
A large number of scenario studies have been published that aim to identify mitigation
strategies for achieving different levels of GHG emission reductions (see among others
Hourcade and Shukla 2001; Morita and Robinson 2001). However, most of these studies
have focused on reducing only the energy-related CO2 emissions, and disregarded
abatement options that reduce non-CO2 gases and the use of carbon plantations.
Furthermore, the number of studies looking at stabilization levels below 550 ppm CO2-eq.
is very limited. A few studies exist that explore the feasibility to stabilize CO2 alone at
350 – 450 ppm CO2; the lowest multi-gas stabilization studies in literature focus on 550 ppm
CO2-eq. (see Section 2). This implies that very little information exists on mitigation
strategies that could stabilize GHG concentrations at the low levels required to achieve a 2–
3 °C temperature target with a high degree of certainty. As a matter of fact, even the number
of studies looking at stabilizing at 550 ppm CO2-eq. is far lower than for higher stabilization
targets (see Morita et al. 2000; Swart et al. 2002). Finally, most earlier studies have not
1 ‘CO2 equivalence’ expresses the radiative forcing of other anthropogenic radiative forcing agents in terms
of the equivalent CO2 concentration that would result in the same level of forcing. In this paper, the
definition of CO2-eq. concentrations includes the Kyoto gases, tropospheric ozone and sulphur aerosols.
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considered the more recent mitigation options being discussed in the context of ambitious
emission reduction, such as hydrogen and carbon capture and storage (CCS) (Edmonds et al.
2004; IEA 2004a; IPCC 2005). Given current insights into climate risks and the state of the
mitigation literature, there is a very clear and explicit need for comprehensive scenarios that
explore different long-term strategies to stabilize GHG emissions at low levels (Metz and
van Vuuren 2006; Morita and Robinson 2001).
This paper explores different multi-gas stabilization scenarios for concentration levels
for which no scenarios are currently available (below 550 ppm CO2-eq.). In order to study
the impact of different stabilization levels, we have chosen to explore scenarios for a range
ofconcentrations levels (i.e.,650,550and450ppmCO2-eq.) and under specific assumptions
(400 ppm CO2-eq.). As such, the study also goes beyond our own research that did not
cover stabilization scenarios below 550 ppm CO2-eq. (van Vuuren et al. 2006b).
2 The paper
adds to the existing literature in an important way by exploring pathways to those GHG
stabilization levels required for achieving global mean temperature change targets of 2–3 °
C with a high degree of certainty. We specifically focus on the following questions:
& What portfolios of measures could constitute promising strategies for stabilizing
GHG concentrations at 650, 550 and 450 ppm CO2-eq. and below?
& What are the cost levels involved in such strategies and what are the implications
for the energy sector, investment strategies and fuel trade?
& How do uncertainties in the potentials and costs of various options play a role in
terms of the costs and selection of a portfolio of measures?
The focus of this paper will be on mitigation strategies, abatement costs and climate
consequences from a global perspective. In a related paper, we focus on the regional costs
and abatement strategies3 (den Elzen et al. 2006). For costs, we consider direct abatement
costs due to climate policy and do not capture macro-economic costs; for benefits we focus
on the impact on global mean temperature and co-benefits for air pollutants. In our analysis,
we deliberately use an integrated approach, dealing with a wide range of issues that are
relevant in the context of stabilization scenarios including land use consequences and changes
in the energy system. Although several of these issues have been studied earlier for single
stabilization scenarios, here we would like to see how they are related to the GHG
stabilization level.
The analysis was conducted using the IMAGE 2.3 model framework, including the
energy model TIMER 2.0 coupled to the climate policy model FAIR-SiMCaP (for model
description, (see Section 3). A similar framework (using FAIR instead of FAIR-SiMCaP)
has been used earlier to study mitigation strategies, for example in the context of EU climate
policy targets (Criqui et al. 2003; van Vuuren et al. 2003). This model framework was
designed to provide a broad description of the issues involved in the chain of events
causing climate change. It covers a broad range of emission sources (and therefore
abatement options), covering not only the energy sector but also land use, forestry, and
industry. It is therefore suitable for studying the type of mitigation strategies required to
stabilize radiative forcing from GHG and for studying the possible environmental and
economic consequences of such strategies. We use this framework to explore stabilization
2 Earlier we published emission profiles that would lead to stabilization at low GHG concentration levels,
but that study did not look into the question how these emission profiles could be reached (den Elzen and
Meinshausen 2005).
3 Regional costs also depend on possible agreements about regional reduction targets and they therefore
constitute a separate topic that cannot be dealt with in the context of this paper.
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strategies based on three different baseline scenarios, i.e., updated implementations of the
IPCC SRES B2, B1 and A1b scenarios. We perform an extensive sensitivity analysis for the
different options to map out some of the main uncertainties.
The paper is structured as follows. First, we provide a brief overview of earlier work on
stabilization scenarios. We then explain the methods used to develop the new scenarios before
discussing the first results from our three default scenarios and the associated benefits and co-
benefits. Next, we present the results of our uncertainty analysis and also address the question
of whether it is possible to reduce emissions to levels even lower than 450 ppm CO2-eq. After
that, we compare our results to earlier studies and examine the implications of the uncertain-
ties that have been identified. Finally, we present our overall findings.
2 Earlier work on stabilization scenarios
A large number of scenario studies have been published that have explored global mitigation
strategies for stabilizing GHG concentrations. A recent inventory estimated the number of
published GHG emission scenarios at a few hundred, although a large majority of these are
baseline scenarios (scenarios that do not take the effect of climate policy into account) (NIES
2005).4 In the literature on mitigation scenarios, there are a number of recurring themes.
These include:
& The issue of stabilization targets and overshoot;
& The identification of overall cost levels of stabilization;
& The issue of timing (early action or delayed response), partly in relation to
technology development;
& The role of individual technologies and mitigation measures.
In this paper, we will briefly discuss the available literature and indicate how these issues
are handled. The IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR) (Hourcade and Shukla 2001;
Morita and Robinson 2001) provides an overview of the stabilization scenarios as available
at that time.
On the issue of stabilization targets, many studies in the past have focused on
stabilizing CO2 concentration levels. Consistent with this, new multi-gas studies mostly
focus on the comparable measure of stabilizing radiative forcing (expressed in W/m2 or
CO2-eq.) (van Vuuren et al. 2006c). Alternatively, some studies look at temperature
increase targets (as they are more directly related to impacts). One implication of using a
temperature target, however, is the higher level of uncertainty relating to mitigation action
(Matthews and van Ypersele 2003; Richels et al. 2004). Another issue is that staying below
a certain temperature level with a specific likelihood can either be achieved by (a)
stabilizing at a certain radiative forcing level or by (b) peaking at somewhat higher levels,
immediately followed by a reduction of the forcing level (‘overshoot scenarios’). The second
4 It is possible to distinguish between scenarios and emission pathways. Emission pathways focus solely on
emissions, whereas scenarios represent a more complete description of possible future states of the world.
The literature distinguishes between baseline, and mitigation or stabilization scenarios. The first category
includes scenarios without explicit new climate policies. These scenarios do, however, need to assume
policies in other fields than climate policy, and these may still unintentionally have a significant impact on
GHG emissions (e.g., other environmental policies, trade policies). Mitigation scenarios (or climate policy
scenarios) purposely assume climate policies to explore their impact. Stabilization scenarios are a group of
scenarios that include mitigation measures intended to stabilize atmospheric GHG concentrations.
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strategy prevents some of the temperature increase that will occur in the longer term (den
Elzen and Meinshausen 2005; Meinshausen 2006; Wigley 2003). In general, these
overshoot scenarios will involve lower costs than the corresponding stabilization scenarios.
For the lower stabilization levels, overshoot scenarios are the only feasible scenarios since
current concentrations have either already passed these levels, or will do so in the very near
future. In broad terms, the current scenario literature covers stabilization levels from 750 to
450 ppm CO2 for ‘CO2-only’ studies. There are only a few studies that have looked into
stabilizing concentrations at lower concentration levels. Exceptions include the work of
Nakicenovic and Riahi (2003), Azar et al. (2006), and Hijoka et al. (2006). These studies
show that, in principle, low stabilization levels (below 450 ppm CO2) can be achieved at
mitigation costs in the order of 1%–2% of GDP. However, these studies started from
relatively low-emission baseline scenarios.
In multi-gas studies, the range is actually much more limited, with studies typically only
looking at 650 ppm CO2-eq. (van Vuuren et al. 2006c; Weyant et al. 2006). The lowest
scenarios currently found in the literature aim at 550 ppm CO2-eq. (Criqui et al. 2003; van
Vuuren et al. 2006b) and these only give a very low level of probability to limit temperature
increase to less than 2 °C. For a range of probability-distribution functions (PDF), Hare and
Meinshausen (2004) estimated the probability to be about 0% – 30%. The probability of
staying within 2.5 °C is 10% – 50%. A 50% probability (on average) of staying within 2 °C is
obtained for 450 ppm CO2-eq. The only multi-gas studies in the literature that are currently
exploring the consequences of aiming for such low stabilization levels are emission pathway
studies that do not specify the type of mitigation measures leading to the required emissions
reductions (den Elzen and Meinshausen 2005; Meinshausen 2006; Meinshausen et al. 2006).
Different metrics are used for the costs of climate policies. Partial equilibrium models
(such as energy system models) generally report costs as increased energy system costs or
abatement costs (these are annual costs that can be expressed as percentages of GDP). General
equilibrium models, by contrast, generally report reductions of GDP or private consumption
relative to the baseline scenario. For the 30–40 stabilization scenarios analyzed in TAR, the
assessment found very small costs for stabilizing at 750 ppm but stated typical GDP losses of
1%–4% for 450 ppm (Hourcade and Shukla 2001). Costs were found to be a function of the
GHG stabilization level and the baseline emission scenario. This implies that socio-economic
conditions, including policies outside the field of climate policy, are just as important for
stabilization costs as climate policies.
The issue of the timing of the abatement effort was initiated by Hamitt et al. (1992) and
later by Wigley et al. (1996). Wigley et al. (1996) argued that their scenarios, which
postponed abatement action compared to earlier pathways developed by IPCC, were more
cost-effective because of the benefits of technology development, more CO2 absorption by
the biosphere and oceans, and discounting future costs. Their arguments were confirmed in
the analysis of the EMF-14 (energy modeling forum) study (as reported by Hourcade and
Shukla 2001). Other authors, however, responded that this conclusion depends on the
assumptions about discounting, technological change, inertia and uncertainty (Azar 1998;
Azar and Dowlatabadi 1999; Ha-Duong et al. 1997). For low-range concentration targets,
den Elzen and Meinshausen (2005) reported that delaying the peak in global emissions
beyond 2020 leads to very high reduction rates later in the century and therefore to probable
high costs. Assuming induced technology change (instead of exogenous technological
progress simply as function of time) and explicit capital turnover rates could lead to a
preference for early action, or at least a spread of the reduction effort over the century as a
whole (see also van Vuuren et al. 2004). The debate about optimal timing is still ongoing.
Yohe et al. (2004) recently showed that hedging strategies (i.e., cost-optimal reduction
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pathways incorporating the risk of more, or less, stringent action later in the century if new
evidence comes in) to deal with uncertainties may lead to relatively early reduction pathways
leaving as many options open as possible (Berk et al. 2002).
Recently, a lot of attention has been paid to extending the number of reduction options
considered in scenario analysis. One possibility is the inclusion of non-CO2 GHGs. The energy
modeling forum (EMF-21) performed a model comparison study, showing that extending
the reduction options from CO2 only to include other GHGs can reduce costs by about a
third (van Vuuren et al 2006c; Weyant et al. 2006). Recent publications also put forward
several new technologies that could be pivotal in mitigation strategies. First of all, CCS
could play an important role in reducing GHG emissions in the power sector. This
technology could become cost-effective at emission permit prices of around 100–200 US$/
tC (IPCC 2005) and therefore reduce mitigation costs considerably (Edmonds et al. 2004; IEA
2004a). Recent work on hydrogen as an energy carrier has shown that hydrogen may also
reduce mitigation costs but this conclusion depends very much on the assumption of
technology development (Edmonds et al. 2004). Bio-energy in combination with CCS could
be an attractive technology if very ambitious stabilization targets are adopted (Azar et al.
2006). Finally, the debate is still ongoing about whether accounting for technology change
(induced learning vs exogenous assumptions) in itself results in different conclusions about
optimal climate policies. Some studies claim that induced technological change leads to
very significant cost reductions and justifies a preference for early action (Azar and
Dowlatabadi 1999; Barker et al. 2005). Others report fewer benefits and/or no impact on
timing (Manne and Richels 2004).
What are the implications of the current state of knowledge for this study? The most
important aim of this study is to determine whether a multi-gas approach can be used to
achieve the stabilization of GHG concentration at lower levels than those usually considered
in mitigation studies. Our scenarios, based on the emission pathways developed by den Elzen
and Meinshausen (2005) and den Elzen et al. (2007) should be characterized as medium-
term pathways (since they are neither early nor delayed). In terms of the objective of
climate policy, we focus on the stabilization of concentration (and thus not temperature) to
increase the comparability with other studies. den Elzen et al. (2007) indicate how the
results of the emission pathways compare to alternative peaking scenarios. In view of the
debate about new mitigation options, the model framework used in this study covers a large
range of mitigation options (such as non-CO2, CCS, carbon plantations, hydrogen, bio-
energy, nuclear, solar and wind power), and several technologies are described in terms of
induced technological change. The aim of this study is to identify a portfolio of measures
that contribute to the reduction of emissions with the aim of achieving the selected concentra-
tion targets, and to assess the costs associated with this portfolio. Given the major uncertain-
ties involved in each of the mitigation options, we will analyze how some of these uncertainties
impact the overall results.
3 Methodology
3.1 Overall methodology
For the construction of the stabilization scenarios, we use an interlinked modelling frame-
work consisting of the IMAGE 2.3 integrated assessment model, which includes the TIMER
2.0 energy model (de Vries et al. 2001) coupled to the climate policy model FAIR-SiMCaP
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(den Elzen and Lucas 2005; den Elzen and Meinshausen 2005).5 These models have been
linked for the purposes of this analysis in a way similar to that described earlier by van Vuuren
et al. (2003),6 as shown in Fig. 1. The Appendix provides additional information on the
different models used.
The IMAGE 2.3 model is an integrated assessment model consisting of a set of linked
and integrated models that together describe important elements of the long-term dynamics
of global environmental change, such as air pollution, climate change, and land-use change.
IMAGE 2.3 uses a simple climate model and a pattern-scaling method to project climate
change at the grid level. At the grid level, agriculture is described by a rule-based system driven
by regional production levels. Finally, natural ecosystems are described by an adapted version
of the BIOME model. The global energy model, TIMER 2.0, a part of the IMAGE model,
describes primary and secondary demand for, and production of, energy and the related
emissions of GHG and regional air pollutants. The FAIR-SiMCaP 1.1 model is a combination
of the multi-gas abatement-cost model of FAIR 2.1 and the pathfinder module of the SiMCaP 1.0
model. The FAIR cost model distributes the difference between baseline and global emission





































Fig. 1 Linkage and information flows of the applied modelling framework (note CP Carbon plantations).
Numbers in figure are explained in the text
6 In the present framework, FAIR-SIMCAP is used for the calculations of the global emission pathways
instead of the IMAGE 2.2 model.
5 IMAGE 2.3 is an updated version of IMAGE 2.2, the difference being the possibility of exploring impacts
of bio-energy and carbon plantations. TIMER 2.0 is an updated version of TIMER 1.0. The main differences
are additions with respect to hydrogen, bio-energy and modelling of the electric power sector. The FAIR-
SIMCAP model is the combination of the climate policy support tool FAIR and the SiMCaP model.
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for the different emission sources (den Elzen and Lucas 2005).7 The SiMCaP pathfinder module
uses an iterative procedure to find multi-gas emission paths that correspond to a predefined
climate target (den Elzen andMeinshausen 2005). Calculations in all three main models are done
for 17 regions8 of the world.
The overall analysis consists of three major steps (Fig. 1):
1. Both the IMAGE and the TIMER model are used to construct a baseline emission
scenario. Furthermore, the TIMER model yields the potentials and abatement costs of
reducing emissions from energy-related sources, while the IMAGE model provides the
potentials and abatement costs associated with carbon plantations.
2. The FAIR-SiMCaP 1.1 model is used to develop global emission pathways that lead to
a stabilization of the atmospheric GHG concentration. The concentration calculations
are done using the MAGICC 4.1 model that is included in the FAIR-SiMCaP 1.1 model.
(Wigley and Raper 2001). The FAIR model distributes the global emission reduction
from the baseline across the different regions, gases and sources in a cost-optimal way,
using the marginal abatement costs curves. It is assumed that the gases are
substituted on the basis of GWPs, an approach consistent with climate policies under
the Kyoto Protocol and the USA domestic climate policy (White-House 2002).
Furthermore, the model calculates the international permit price, the regional emission
reductions, and the global and regional costs of emission reductions.
3. The IMAGE/TIMER model implements the changes in emission levels resulting from
the abatement action (emission reductions) and the permit price, as determined in the
previous step, to develop the final mitigation scenario (emissions, land use, energy system).
Furthermore, the environmental impacts are assessed using the climate model of IMAGE.
In our analysis, we assume that reductions can be distributed across all 17 regions cost-
optimally from 2013 onwards. This implies the presence of some form of international
mechanism that justifies this least-cost assumption, such as emission trading.
3.2 Baseline emissions
The baseline scenarios used in this study are based on IPCC-SRES scenarios (Nakicenovic
et al. 2000b). This set of baseline scenarios explores different possible pathways for GHG
emissions and can roughly be categorized along two dimensions: the degree of
globalization vs regionalization, and the degree of orientation towards economic objectives
as opposed to an orientation towards social and environmental objectives. In 2001, the
IMAGE team published detailed elaborations of these scenarios (IMAGE-team 2001a, b).
Although the scenarios are still broadly consistent with the literature, new insights have
emerged for some parameters. For instance, population scenarios and economic growth
assumptions for low-income regions are now generally lower than assumed in SRES (van
Vuuren and O_Neill 2006). Against this background, a set of updated IMAGE scenarios was
developed (see Fig. 2). Here, we use the B2 scenario as the main baseline scenario, with the
A1b and B1 scenarios being used to show the impacts of different baseline assumptions.
7 Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) curves reflect the additional costs of reducing the last unit of CO2-eq.
emissions.
8 Canada, USA, OECD-Europe, eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Oceania and Japan; Central
America, South America, northern Africa, western Africa, eastern Africa, southern Africa, Middle East and
Turkey, south Asia (incl. India), South-East Asia and east Asia (incl. China) (IMAGE-team 2001a).
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The new implementation of B2 focuses explicitly on exploring the possible trajectory of
greenhouse gas emissions on the basis of medium assumptions for the most important
drivers (population, economy, technology development and lifestyle). In terms of its quanti-
fication, the B2 scenario roughly follows the reference scenario of the World Energy Outlook
2004 for the first 30 years (IEA 2004b). After 2030, economic growth converges to the B2
trajectory of the previous IMAGE scenarios (IMAGE-team 2001a). The long-term UN
medium population projection is used for population (UN 2004).
The A1b scenario, by contrast, represents a world with fast economic growth driven by
further globalization and rapid technology development. As the scenario that material-
intensive lifestyles are adopted globally, energy consumption grows rapidly. The B1 scenario
describes a world characterized by strong globalization in combination with environmental
protection and a reduction of global inequality. It assumes the use of very efficient
technologies, resulting in relatively low energy use. The assumptions for population and
economic growth in the A1 and B1 scenarios have been taken from, respectively, the Global
Orchestration and Technogarden scenarios of these (MA 2006). In all three scenarios, trends
in agricultural production (production levels and yields) are also based on the millennium
ecosystem scenarios, which were elaborated for these parameters by the IMPACT model
(Rosegrant et al. 2002). All other assumptions are based on the earlier implementation of the
SRES scenarios.
3.3 Assumptions in the different subsystems and marginal abatement costs
We adopt a hybrid approach to determine the abatement efforts among the different categories























































































































Fig. 2 Driving forces and fossil fuel CO2 emissions of the IMAGE 2.3 SRES scenarios in comparison to the
IPCC SRES marker scenarios (Nakicenovic et al. 2000a)
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(energy, carbon plantations, and non-CO2) is translated into aggregated baseline- and time-
dependent MAC curves. These curves are than used in the FAIR model to distribute the
mitigation effort among these different categories and to determine the international permit
price. The corresponding reduction measures at the more detailed level are determined by
implementing the permit price in the different ‘expert’ models for energy (TIMER) and
carbon plantations (IMAGE). For instance, in the case of energy, the TIMERmodel results in
a consistent description of the energy system under the global emission constraint set by
FAIR-SiMCaP.
The TIMER, IMAGE and FAIR-SiMCaP models have been linked so that output of one
model is the input of the second model (see Fig. 1). In addition, also the model-specific
assumptions in the different models have been harmonized. In most cases, this was done on
the basis of the storyline of the different scenarios being implemented. For example, tech-
nology development is set low for all parameters in the different models in the A2 scenario.
The same holds for other driving forces. In terms of land use, both carbon plantations and
bio-energy calculations start with the same land-use scenario (implementation factors prevent
them using the same land) and the same land price equations. A 5% per year social discount
rate is used to calculate the net present value for the mitigation scenarios. In the energy system,
investment decisions are compared using a 10% per year discount rate, which provides a better
reflection of the medium term investment criteria used in making such investments. Table 1
summarizes some of the assumptions made. All costs are expressed in 1995 US$.
3.3.1 Energy
The TIMER MAC curves (used by the FAIR model) are constructed by imposing an
emission permit price (carbon tax) and recording the induced reduction of CO2 emissions.
9
There are several responses in TIMER to adding an emission permit price. In energy
supply, options with high carbon emissions (such as coal and oil) become more expensive
compared to options with low or zero emissions (such as natural gas, CCS, bio-energy,
nuclear power, solar and wind power). The latter therefore gain market share. In energy
demand, investments in efficiency become more attractive. The induced reduction of CO2
emissions is recorded for sight-years from 2010 to 2100 (in 10-year steps). Two different
permit price profiles were used to explore responses: one that assumes a linear increase
from 2010 to the permit price value in the sight year (‘linear price MAC’) and one that
reaches the maximum value 30 years earlier (‘block price MAC’). The second profile results
in more CO2 reductions because the energy system has more time to respond. Depending
on the pathway of the actual permit price in the stabilization scenario, FAIR combines
the linear price MAC curves and the block price MAC curves.10 In this way, it is possible to
take into account (as a first-order approximation) the time pathway of earlier abatement.
In the baseline, stricter investment criteria are used for investments in energy efficiency
than for investments in energy supply. Investments in energy efficiency are made only if the
apparent average pay-back-time is less than three years (for industry) or two years (other
10 FAIR looks 30 years back in time and, by comparing the tax profile in that period to the one assumed in
the tax profiles used in TIMER, constructs a linear combination of the two types of response curves. A
rapidly increasing tax in FAIR will lead to the use of the linear tax, while a more constant tax level in FAIR
will imply the use of the block tax.
9 The tax is intended to induce a cost-effective set of measures and is in themodel equivalent to a emission permit
price. In the rest of the paper, we will use the term (emission) permit price. It should be noted that in reality, the
same set of measures as induced by the permit price can also be implement by other type of policies.
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Pessimistic assumption Base case Optimistic assumption
Carbon
plantations
Carbon uptake reduced by
25% + implementation
factor reduced to 30%
Implementation factor 40%
(i.e., 40% of maximum
potential is used)
Carbon uptake increased
by 25% + implementation
factor increased to 50%
Non-CO2 20% increase of costs;
20% decrease of potential
Expert judgment as
described in Lucas et al.
(2005). Total reduction
potential of non-CO2
gases slightly above 50%
20% decrease of costs;
20% increase of potential
Hydrogen No hydrogen penetration Default assumptions lead to
hydrogen penetration by
the end of the century
Optimistic assumptions for
fuels cells and H2
production costs (10%
reduction of investment




Climate policies do not
lead to removal of
implementation barriers
for efficiency




Climate policies lead to full
removal of implementation
barriers for efficiency
Bio-energy Less available land for
bio-energy (50% less)
Bio-energy can also be
used











No carbon capture and
storage
Medium estimates for CCS
storage potential (see
Table 5)








transaction costs of 15$/tC
Full emission trading
Land use Agricultural yields do not
improve as fast (following





Agricultural yields do not
improve as fast (following
MA’s global orchestration
scenario)
Baseline IMAGE 2.3 A1b IMAGE 2.3 B2 IMAGE 2.3 B1
All All above, excluding land
use and baseline
All above, excluding land
use and baseline
All above, excluding land
use and baseline
Not for all options both more pessimistic and more optimistic assumptions were tested.
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sectors) (see de Beer 1998).11 In low-income countries, we assume that lower efficiency
levels are caused by less strict apparent pay-back-time criteria (de Vries et al. 2001). The
criteria used in energy supply (based on a 10% discount rate and the economic life time
depending on the type of technology applied) corresponds more-or-less to a pay-back
time of six to seven years. The difference between demand and supply investment criteria is
based on historical evidence (barriers to demand-side investments include lack of
information, more diffuse investors, higher risks and lack of capital). Under climate
policies, investments into energy efficiency could therefore form a very cost-effective
measure if these barriers can be overcome. In our calculations, we assume that this is
partly the case as a result of (1) an increase in attention for ways to reduce carbon
emissions (leading to more information) and (2) the availability of capital flows,
including flows to developing countries, that could possibly result from carbon trading
(or other flexible mechanisms). Based on this, we assume a convergence of the pay-back-
time criterion to six years as a function of the existing emission permit price – with full
convergence at the highest price considered, i.e., 1,000 US$/tCeq.
3.3.2 Carbon plantations
The MAC curves for carbon plantations have been derived using the IMAGE model (for
methodology, see (Graveland et al. 2002; Strengers et al. 2007). In IMAGE, the potential
carbon uptake of plantation tree species is estimated for land that is abandoned by agriculture
(using a 0.5 × 0.5 grid), and compared to carbon uptake by natural vegetation. Only those
grid cells are considered in which sequestration by plantations is greater than sequestration by
natural vegetation. In the calculations, we assumed that carbon plantations are harvested at
regular time intervals, and that the wood is used to meet existing wood demand. Regional
carbon sequestration supply curves are constructed on the basis of grid cells that are
potentially attractive for carbon plantations. These are converted into MAC curves by adding
two kinds of costs: land costs and establishment costs. We found that, under the SRES
scenarios, the cumulative abandoned agricultural area ranges from 725 and 940 Mha in 2100,
potentially sequestering 116 to 146 GtC over the century (the term agricultural land in this paper
covers both crop and pasture land). The costs of the reductions vary over a wide range.
3.3.3 Non-CO2 gases
For non-CO2, the starting point of our analysis consists of the MAC curves provided
by EMF-21 (Weyant et al. 2006). This set is based on detailed abatement options, and
includes curves for CH4 and N2O emissions from energy- and industry-related emissions
and from agricultural sources, as well as abatement options for the halocarbons. This set
includes MAC curves over a limited cost range of 0 to 200 US$/tC-eq., and does not include
technological improvements over time. Lucas et al. (in press) have extended this set on
the basis of a literature survey and expert judgement about long-term abatement potential
and costs (see also van Vuuren et al. 2006b). The long-term potential is significantly higher
than current potential as a result of technology development and the removal of
11 A pay-back-time is a simple investment criterion that indicates the time-period required to earn back the
original investment. Research indicates that many actors are not aware of the energy efficiency improvement
measures that are available to them that have shorter pay-back-time periods than their official criterion. As a
result, the average apparent pay-back-time of a sector is considerably lower than the investment criteria that
are stated to be used by these actors (de Beer 1998).
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implementation barriers. The overall potential amounts to about 3 GtC-eq. annually (with the
lion’s share available below 200 US$/tC-eq.).
3.4 Emission pathways
This study uses a set of global multi-gas emission pathways that meet GHG concentration
stabilization targets at 450, 550 and 650 ppm CO2-eq. (den Elzen and Meinshausen 2005).
These pathways are assumed to be technically feasible, as we calculated them using the MAC
curves discussed above. In general terms, three main criteria were used when developing the
pathways. First, a maximum reduction rate was assumed reflecting the technical (and
political) inertia that limits emission reductions. Fast reduction rates would require the early
replacement of existing fossil-fuel-based capital stock, and this may involve high costs.
Secondly, the reduction rates compared to baseline were spread out over time as far as
possible – but avoiding rapid early reduction rates and, thirdly, the reduction rates were only
allowed to change slowly over time. The selected values are based on the reduction rates of
the post-SRES mitigation scenarios (e.g., Swart et al. 2002) and the lower range of published
mitigation scenarios (Azar et al. 2006; Nakicenovic and Riahi 2003). In the case of the 650
and 550 ppm CO2-eq. pathways, the resulting pathway leads to stabilization below the target
level and without overshoot between 2100 and 2200. For the 450 ppm CO2-eq. concentration
target, however, a certain overshoot (or peaking) is assumed: concentrations may first increase
to 510 ppm before stabilizing at 450 ppm CO2-eq. before 2200. This overshoot is justified by
reference to present concentration levels, which are already substantial, and the attempt to avoid
drastic sudden reductions in the emission pathways presented.
4 Stabilizing GHG concentration at 650, 550, 450 ppm: central scenarios
4.1 Emission pathways and reductions
Under the central baseline, B2, worldwide primary energy use nearly doubles between
2000 and 2050 and increases by another 35% between 2050 and 2100. Most of this growth
occurs in non-annex I regions (about 80%). Oil continues to be the most important energy
carrier in the first half of the century, with demand being mainly driven by the transport sector.
Natural gas dominates new capacity in electric power in the first decades, but starts to be
replaced by coal from 2030 onwards due to increasing gas prices. As a result, coal becomes
the dominant energy carrier in the second half of the twenty-first century. Energy-sector CO2
emissions continue to rise for most of the century, peaking at 18 GtC in 2080. Total GHG
emissions12 also increase, i.e., from about 10 GtC-eq. today to 23 GtC-eq. in 2100 (Fig. 3).
Figure 3 also shows that compared to existing scenario literature; this baseline is a me-
dium-high emission baseline. As a result of decreasing deforestation rates, CO2 emissions
from land use decrease. At the same time, CH4 emissions, mostly from agriculture, in-
crease. The GHG concentration reaches a level of 925 ppm CO2-eq., leading to an increase
in the global mean temperature of 3 °C in 2100 (for a climate sensitivity of 2.5 °C).
Figure 3a shows that, in order to reach the selected emission pathway that leads to
stabilization of GHG radiative forcing at 650, 550 and 450 ppm CO2-eq., GHG emissions
need to be reduced in 2100 by respectively 65%, 80% and 90% compared to the B2 baseline.
12 The term total GHG emissions in this report refers to all GHG covered by the Kyoto protocol: i.e., CO2,
CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF6.
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The short-term differences are even more significant: In the case of the 650 ppm CO2-eq.
pathway, emissions can still increase slightly and stabilize at a level that is 40% above
current emissions in the next three to four decades, followed by a slow decrease. In the case
of the 550 ppm CO2-eq. pathway, however, global emissions need to peak around 2020,
directly followed by steep reductions in order to avoid overshooting the 550 ppm CO2-eq.
concentration level. For stabilization at 450 ppm CO2-eq., short-term reductions become
even more stringent, with global emissions peaking around 2020 at a level of 20% above
2000 levels.
4.2 Abatement action in the stabilization scenarios
4.2.1 Abatement across different gases
Figure 4 shows the (cost-optimal) reduction in the mitigation scenarios in terms of different
gases (upper panel). Table 2, in addition, indicates the emission levels. In the short term,
in all stabilization scenarios, a substantial share of the reduction is achieved by reducing
non-CO2 gases while only 10% of the reductions come from reducing energy-related CO2
emissions (see also Lucas et al. 2005). The disproportionate contribution of non-CO2
abatement is caused mainly by relatively low-cost abatement options that have been identified
for non-CO2 gases (e.g., reducing CH4 emissions from energy production and N2O emissions
from adipic and acidic acid industries). It should be noted that this is related to the fact that we
use GWPs to determine the cost-effective mix of reductions among the different GHGs (see
Section 3). Alternative approaches, e.g., long-term costs optimization under a radiative
forcing target, may result to a different mix (van Vuuren et al. 2006c). After 2015, more and
more reductions will need to come from CO2 in the energy system, increasing to 85% by
2100. This shift simply reflects that non-CO2 represents about 20% of total GHG emissions
and the limited reduction potential for some of the non-CO2 gases. In addition, some non-
CO2 GHGs cannot be reduced fully due to limited reduction potential (this is the case for
some sources of land-use-related CH4 but is particularly true for some of the N2O emission
sources, see below). The proportion of non-CO2 abatement does decline somewhat further in
the 450 ppm CO2-eq. scenario than in the 650 ppmCO2-eq. scenario (with the proportion being
limited by the absolute non-CO2 reduction potential).
More detailed analysis across the different sources shows that, for CH4, relatively large
reductions are achieved in the areas of landfills and the production of coal, oil and gas.





































b) B2 Baseline and other baselines
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EMF21 range
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 IMAGE 2.3 B1
Fig. 3 Global CO2-eq. emissions (all sources2) for the B2 baseline emission and pathways to stabilization at
a concentration of 650, 550 and 450 ppm CO2-eq. (a, left) and the B2 baseline emissions compared to
alternative baselines (b, right), sources: for the EMF-21 scenarios (van Vuuren et al. 2006c; Waterloo et al.
2001)
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In total, under the 450 ppm CO2-eq. stabilization scenario, emissions are reduced by 70%
compared to the baseline. In the less stringent 650 ppm stabilization case, CH4 emissions
are halved (returning roughly to today’s levels). In the case N2O, substantial reductions are
achieved for acidic and adipic acid production (up to 70% reduction). However, in
comparison to land-use related N2O emissions, this only represents a small source. For the
Table 2 Emissions in 2000 and in 2100 for the B2 baseline and the stabilization scenarios
2000 2100




Electricity sector 2.38 7.96 1.04 0.23 0.09
Industry 0.62 1.54 0.38 0.18 0.03
Buildings 0.50 0.80 0.32 0.23 0.06
Transport 0.79 2.48 0.69 0.32 0.03
Other 0.79 2.11 0.82 0.40 0.15
Total 6.96 18.40 5.20 2.50 0.94
CO2 land use 0.90 0.10 0.75 0.67 0.77
CH4 1.88 3.02 1.33 1.11 0.91
N2O 0.68 1.03 0.81 0.78 0.69
F-gases 0.14 0.87 0.35 0.27 0.04
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Fig. 4 Emission reductions for total GHG emissions contributed by gas (upper panel; a) and for energy CO2
emissions contribute by reduction measure category (lower panel; b) applied to stabilization scenarios at 650,
550 and 450 ppm CO2-eq
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land-use-related N2O sources, emission reduction rates are smaller. As a result, total N2O
emission reductions in the most stringent scenario amount to about 35% compared to
baseline. In the most stringent case, emissions of halocarbons are reduced to almost zero
for the group as a whole. In the other two scenarios, considerable reduction rates are still
achieved.
The use of carbon plantations contributes about 0.9 GtC annually to the overall miti-
gation objective in 2100 in the 450 ppm CO2-eq. scenario but less in the other two scenarios
(0.5 and 0.25 GtC annually). In all three scenarios, East Asia, South America and the
former Soviet Union together account for more than 50% of the carbon plantation
mitigation effort (regional detail is not shown in figures – but can be found in Strengers
et al. (2007). The trees used vary according to the location and include Populus Nigra (East
Asia and Europe), Picea Abies (Canada, USA and former USSR) and E. Grandis (South
America, central Africa and Indonesia). In all three scenarios, high sequestration rates
(more than 0.1 GtC annually) are achieved only after 2030–2035 due to limited land
availability early on. Some of the mitigation by carbon plantations can be achieved at
relatively low-costs – and form a substantial part of the potential used in the 650 ppm
CO2-eq. stabilization scenario. The potential of carbon plantations does depend more on
external assumptions (e.g., the implementation fraction) than on the stabilization target.
4.2.2 Abatement action in the energy system
Figure 5 shows that the climate policies required to reach the stabilization pathways lead
to substantial changes in the energy system compared to the baseline scenario (shown for
450 ppm CO2-eq.). These changes are more profound when going from 650 to 450 ppm
CO2-eq. In the most stringent scenario, global primary energy use is reduced by around
20%. Clearly, the reductions are not similar for the different energy carriers. The largest
reductions occur for coal, with the remaining coal consumption being primarily used in
electric power stations using CCS. There is also a substantial reduction for oil. Reductions
for natural gas are less substantial, while other energy carriers – in particular solar, wind
and nuclear-based electricity and modern biomass – gain market share.13
The largest reduction in the energy sector results from changes in the energy supply
(Fig. 4; lower panel). Some changes stand out. First of all, under our default assumptions,
13 Modern biomass includes gaseous or liquid fuels produced from plants or trees. It differs from traditional


























































































































Fig. 5 Primary energy use in the B2 baseline (left, a) and the 450 ppm CO2-eq. stabilization scenario (right,
b). Note: Nuclear, solar, wind and hydro power have been reported at a virtual efficiency of 40%; ‘bio-
energy’ includes traditional biofuels; renewables include hydro, solar and wind power
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CCS – mainly in the power sector – accounts for a major proportion of the emission reduc-
tions (up to a third of the reductions in energy-related CO2 emissions). As a result, large
amounts of CO2 are stored. In the 650 ppm case, 160 GtC, or about 2 GtC annually on
average, needs to be stored, mainly in empty gas and oil fields. In the 550 and 450 cases, these
numbers are 250 and 300 GtC, or about 3 GtC annually. Here, we use medium estimates of
storage capacity (around 1,000 GtC) but estimates in the low range are in the order of 100 GtC
(Hendricks et al. 2002). In the more densely populated regions, we find that under our
medium assumptions reservoirs from depleted fossil fuel resources will be filled near the
end of the century so that these regions will also use aquifers as a storage option.14 The
decreasing reservoir capacity will lead to slightly higher costs. It should be noted that CCS
technology still has to be proven in large scale application – and aquifer capacity is
uncertain.
Bio-energy use also accounts for a large proportion of the emission reductions. In the
baseline scenario of this study about 200 EJ of bio-energy are used. In the most stringent
stabilization scenario, bio-energy use increases to 350 EJ. In terms of crops, the bio-energy
is produced from a mixture of crops (sugar cane, maize and woody bio-energy depending on
the region). The use of bio-energy requires land where, in the baseline, there would be
regrowing natural vegetation sequestering carbon. The decrease in carbon sequestration by
bio-energy production compared to natural vegetation regrowth amounts to about 1–5 kg C
per GJ of bio-energy produced, depending on the region and biome (this number represents
the annual average across the whole scenario period, by taking the cumulative bio-energy
production and the cumulative difference in carbon uptake between the land used for bio-
energy production and the original vegetation). This compares to standard emission factors of
25 kg C per GJ for coal, 20 kg C per GJ for oil and 15 kg C per GJ for natural gas. The
contribution shown in Fig. 4 indicates the net contribution.
Solar, wind and nuclear power also account for a considerable proportion of the required
reductions. In our baseline scenario, the application of renewables (i.e., hydro, wind and solar
power) is considerably larger than that of nuclear power (based on current policies and costs).
In the mitigation scenario both categories increase their market share. For hydropower, we
assumed no response to climate policy (given the fact that in the baseline most regions are
already approaching their maximum potential levels – and investments into hydropower are
often related to other objectives than energy alone). As a result of their intermittent character,
the contribution of solar and wind power is somewhat limited by a declining ability to
contribute to a sufficiently reliable electric power system at high penetration rates. As a result,
in the model the increase in nuclear power compared to the baseline is larger than that of
renewables. The finding that under climate policy, nuclear power could become a competitive
option to produce electric power is consistent with several other studies (MIT 2003; Sims et
al. 2003). However, more flexible power systems, different assumptions on the consequences
of intermittency for renewables, the development of storage systems, technological
breakthroughs or taking account of public acceptance of nuclear power could easily lead to
a different mix of nuclear power, solar and wind power and CCS technologies (and still lead
to a similar reduction rate).
Energy efficiency represents a relatively important part of the portfolio early on in the
century – but a much smaller share compared to baseline later on. The main reason for the
14 In our analysis we have used the reservoir estimates as estimated by Hendriks et al. (2002), including their
estimates for aquifers. Hendriks et al. (2002) restricted the potentially available storage capacity in aquifers
severely based on safety requirements for storage. Still, one might argue that the reservoir estimates for
aquifers are more uncertain as those for (empty) fossil fuel reservoirs.
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decreasing impact is that costs reductions of zero carbon energy supply options reduces
the effectiveness of energy efficiency measures. In addition, the fact that energy efficiency
will be closer to the technology frontier in many parts of world will slow down further
improvement. Globally, energy use is reduced in 2100 by about 10% in the 650 ppm case and
about 20% in the 450 ppm case. The contribution of efficiency does vary strongly by region
and over time. In western Europe, for instance, in the model the annual rate of real efficiency
improvement in the baseline is about 1.1% per year in the first half of the century, and 0.8%
per year over the century as a whole (these numbers refer to the underlying efficiency indi-
cators in the model; not the energy intensity (energy over GDP) that improves somewhat
faster due to structural change). The increased energy prices under climate policies in
combination with the reduction of investment barriers could raise the numbers to 1.5% and
1.0% per year respectively in the 450 ppm CO2-eq. scenario. In India, climate policy could
have a much larger impact. Here, baseline efficiency improvement is assessed at 2.2% per
year in the first 40 years and 1.8% per year over the century. Climate policies could push up
these numbers to 2.9% and 2.1% per year respectively.
An alternative way to look at these data is to use the Kaya indicators of energy intensity
(GJ/$) and the carbon factor (kg C/GJ) (Kaya 1989). Under the baseline scenario, energy
intensity improves significantly by about 70% worldwide between 2000 and 2100. The
carbon factor remains virtually constant (in line with historic trends). It is only in the last
decades that some decarbonization occurs as high oil prices induce a transition to bio-energy.
This implies that, in the baseline scenario, energy intensity improvement is the main
contributor to decreasing the ratio between CO2 emissions and GDP growth (kg C/GDP). In
the mitigation scenarios, the rates increase for both energy intensity and carbon factor
improvement. While the contribution of the two factors to emission reductions compared to
baseline levels is about the same in 2020 (this can be seen in Fig. 6 since the mitigation
scenario 2020 points are moved parallel to the diagonal in the figure compared to the baseline
scenario points), changes in the carbon factor compared to baseline (in other words: changes
in energy supply) in 2050 and 2100 contribute much more to lower emission levels than energy
intensity. Under the 450 ppm scenario, the carbon factor decreases by about 85% compared to
baseline by the end of the century.
4.3 Costs
4.3.1 Abatement costs
As costs measures, we will focus on marginal permit prices and abatement costs. The latter
are calculated on the basis of the marginal permit prices and represent the direct additional
costs due to climate policy, but do not capture macro-economic costs (nor the avoided dam-
ages of climate change). Figure 7 shows that the scenarios involving stabilization at 650 and
550 ppm CO2-eq. ppm are characterized by a rather smooth increase in the marginal price
followed by a drop by the end of the century. The latter is caused by a fall in emissions in
the baseline and further cost reductions in mitigation technologies (in particular, hydrogen
fuel cells start entering the market by this time, allowing for reductions in the transport
sector at much lower costs). For the 450 ppm stabilization scenario, the marginal price
rises steeply during the first part of the century – reaching a marginal price of over 600
US$/tC-eq. by 2050 – and finally stabilizes at 800 US$/tC-eq. by the end of the century.
The high marginal price is particularly necessary to reduce emissions from the more non-
responsive sources such as CO2 emissions from transport or some of the non-CO2 emis-
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sions from agricultural sources, while other sources, such as electric power, already reduce
their emissions to virtually zero at a permit prices of ‘only’ 200 – 300 US$/tC-eq.
Costs can also be expressed as abatement costs as a percentage of GDP. This indicator is
shown over time (Fig. 7; right panel), and accumulated across the century (net present
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Fig. 7 Marginal carbon-equivalent price for stabilizing greenhouse gas concentration at 650, 550 and 450 ppm
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Fig. 6 Relative changes in global energy intensity (energy/GDP) and the carbon factor (CO2/energy) in the
B2 baseline and the three mitigation cases compared to 2000 values. Note: The diagonal line indicates equal
reduction in the energy intensity and carbon factor compared to 2000. Values are indicated for all the
scenarios: 2020, 2050 and 2100. The ovals indicate the outcomes of the mitigation cases for similar years
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increase to about 0.5% of GDP, after which they decline slightly to about 0.3% of GDP.
This reduction is caused by an increase in global GDP and stabilizing climate costs due to a
somewhat lower permit price and a stabilizing emission gap between baseline and the
mitigation scenario. The same trend is observed for the other stabilization scenarios,
although at higher costs. The abatement costs of the 550 ppm CO2-eq. stabilization scenario
increase to 1.2% of GDP, while the abatement costs of the 450 ppm CO2-eq. stabilization
scenario increase to 2.0% of global GDP. The direct abatement costs of about 0%–2.5% of
GDP can be compared to the total expenditures of the energy sector (which, worldwide, are
about 7.5% of GDP today and expected to remain nearly constant under our baseline) or to
the expenditures on environmental policy (in the EU around 2.0%–2.8%, mostly for waste
and wastewater management).
The net present value of the abatement costs follow a similar trend (across the different
stabilization levels) as described above for the costs over time (Fig. 8). For default baseline
(B2), the costs vary from 0.2% of GDP for stabilization at 650 ppm to 1.1% of GDP in the
450 case.
4.3.2 Changes in fuel trade patterns
Figure 9 shows the imports and exports of different fuels in 2050. The clearest differences are
found in the oil and coal trades, which are greatly reduced as a result of lower consumption
levels. On the one hand, oil-exporting regions will see their exports reduced by a factor of about
2–3. On the other hand, the oil imports of importing countries are significantly reduced.
Interestingly, natural gas trade is hardly affected because natural gas can be used very
effectively in combination with CCS. An interesting area is the role played by the bio-energy
trade. This trade increases substantially and major exporting regions (including, for instance,
South America and the former Soviet Union) could benefit from this. Currently, oil-importing
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P)Fig. 8 Net present value (NPV)
of abatement costs for different
stabilization levels as percentage
of the NPV of GDP, starting from
different baseline scenarios (dis-
count rate 5%)
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5 Benefits and co-benefits
5.1 Climate benefits of stabilization
The three multi-gas stabilization scenarios analyzed here lead to clearly different temper-
ature increases, both during this century and in the long run. Table 3 shows some of the
parameters, describing the different scenarios in more detail and using a single value for
climate sensitivity (2.5 °C). The table shows that, in 2100, the 650 and 550 ppm CO2-eq.
stabilization scenarios are still approaching the stabilization levels, while the 450 ppm
CO2-eq. scenario has in fact overshot its target (as designed) and is approaching its target
from a higher concentration level (the 2100 CO2-eq. concentration is 479 ppm). For CO2
only, our three scenarios generate CO2 concentrations of 524, 463 and 424 ppm for 2100
and this is indeed on the lower side of existing CO2-only stabilization scenarios in the
literature.
It should be noted, however, that the temperature results of the different stabilization
scenarios depend to a considerable extent on the uncertain relationship between the GHG
concentration and temperature increase. This implies that impacts on temperature can better
be expressed in probabilistic terms. Figure 10 shows, on the basis of the work of Meinshausen
(2006), the probabilities of overshooting a 2 -C and a 2.5 °C target in the light of the








CO2-eq. CO2 % 2100 Equilibrium
B2 947 708 0 3.0 –
B2 650 ppm CO2-eq. 625 524 36 2.3 2.9
B2 550 ppm CO2-eq. 538 463 50 2.0 2.5
B2 450 ppm CO2-eq. 479 424 61 1.7 2.0
Fig. 9 World volume of fuel trade between the 17 world regions (EJ); 2000, Baseline (B2) and stabilization
scenarios (650, 550 and 450 ppm CO2-eq)
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different stabilization levels explored in this paper (the corridor shown is a result of the fact
that Meinshausen considered several PDFs published in the literature). In the case of a 2 °C
target, the 650 ppm scenario gives a probability of meeting this target between 0% –18%
depending on the PDF used. By contrast, the 450 ppm scenarios result in a probability range
of 22% –73%. Similar trends are found for a 2.5 °C target. Here, 650 ppm provides a
probability range of 0% –37%; 450 ppm a range from 40% – 90%.
Although we have not specifically targeted any rate of temperature change, a rate can
be a useful proxy for the risk of adverse impacts from climate change (in particular eco-
systems; see Fig. 11). In the baseline scenario, the rate of temperature change is around
0.25 °C per decade. In the mitigation scenarios, the rate of temperature increase drops
significantly in particular in the second half of the century. In the 650 ppm stabilization
scenario, the rate drops below 0.2 °C per decade around 2050 and below 0.1 °C in 2080. In
the 550 and 650 stabilization scenarios, the rate of change drops even further while, for
450 ppm CO2-eq., the rate actually falls below zero in 2100. In the early decades (until
2030), the mitigation scenarios hardly perform any better than the baseline. The reason is
that, in the mitigation scenarios, changes in the energy system to reduce CO2 emissions also
lead to a reduction in sulphur cooling (as already emphasized by Wigley 1991).15 In our
earlier calculations, in fact, this could even lead to an temporarily higher rate of temperature
increase for some of our mitigation scenarios compared to baseline (van Vuuren et al. 2006b).
The somewhat smaller impact here is mostly due to the increased potential to reduce
non-CO2 GHGs, in combination with the higher overall rates of GHG emission reduction.
By using GWPs as the basis of substitution between the different greenhouse gases, our
method evaluates CH4 emission reduction as relatively cheap compared to reducing CO2 (see
also van Vuuren et al. 2006c). As reducing CH4 is much less coupled to reducing sulphur
and the impact of reducing CH4 on radiative forcing is much more direct, the high degree of
CH4 reduction in our scenarios mitigates the impact of reduced sulphur cooling. This is
somewhat comparable to the ‘alternative’ mitigation scenario suggested by Hansen et al. (2000).
15 The impact of sulphur emissions on temperature increase is calculated in IMAGE based on the pattern
scaling methodology that was developed by Schlesinger et al. (2000).














































Fig. 10 Probability of equilibrium temperature change staying within the 2 or 2.5 °C limit for compared to
pre-industrial for different CO2-eq. concentration levels compared to pre-industrial (following calculations of
(Meinshausen 2006). Note: The lines indicate the probability function as indicated in the individual studies
quoted by (Meinshausen 2006); the grey area indicates the total range between the highest and lowest study
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5.2 Co-benefits and additional costs
5.2.1 Impacts on regional air pollutants
Many air pollutants and GHGs have common sources. Their emissions interact in the
atmosphere and, separately or jointly, cause a variety of environmental effects at the local,
regional and global scales. Emission control strategies that simultaneously address air
pollutants and GHGs may therefore lead to a more efficient use of resources at all scales.
Current studies indicate that, when climate policies are in place, in the short-term (in par-
ticular the Kyoto period) potential co-benefits could be substantial, with financial savings in
the order of 20% –50% of the abatement costs of the climate policy (e.g., van Vuuren et al.
2006a). In this study, we have focused our analysis on the consequences of climate policies
for SO2 and NOx emissions by using the same emission coefficients for SO2 and NOx as
those assumed under the baseline (reflecting similar policies for emissions of these
substances), and simply quantifying the impact of changes in the energy system on
emissions.
Figure 12 shows that the changes induced by climate policy in the energy system to
reduce CO2 emissions also reduce SO2 emissions, in particular at lower reduction levels.
This can be explained by the fact that coal in particular is used in conventional power plants,
Fig. 12 Reduction of CO2 emission compared to baseline (baseline = 100%) in the three B2 stabilization































Fig. 11 Rate of temperature
change for 2000–2100 assuming
a 2.5 °C climate sensitivity
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contributing to an even larger proportion of SO2 emissions than of CO2 emissions. Phasing
out conventional fossil-fired power plants and reducing oil inputs into transport and re-
placing them by either fossil plants with CCS or renewables does significantly reduce
SO2 emissions. In the case of NOx, there is a similar relationship between CO2 emission
reductions and NOx emission reductions – although here NOx emissions reductions are
smaller than those of CO2. The figures show that there are clear co-benefits for regional
air pollution resulting from climate policy. In low-income countries, a focus on the
potential synergies of climate change policies and air pollution policies could be even
more important than in high-income countries. Synergy effects of climate policies on
regional and urban air pollution may in fact be a reason for non-OECD countries to
contribute to early emission reductions.
5.2.2 Impacts on land use
Several of the mitigation options considered have an impact on land use. Table 4 describes
land use under the three main mitigation scenarios. As explained in Section 3, for bio-
energy crops the modelling system may use 60% of the abandoned agricultural land and
25% of natural grassland or similar biomes. Carbon plantations may use 40% of abandoned
agricultural land. In our scenarios significant amount of agricultural land are abandoned
through the simulation period. In the first half of the century, this occurs in OECD regions
and the former Soviet Union – mostly as result of a stabilizing food demand (due to a
stabilizing population) and continuing yield increases (see IMAGE-team 2001b; Rosegrant
et al. 2002; Strengers et al. 2004). In some developing regions (e.g., east Asia) similar
dynamics may result in the availability of abandoned agricultural land in the second half of
the century (Strengers et al. 2004). This result obviously depends on the yield improve-
ments that are assumed in the scenario. The scenarios described here are based on the yield
improvements reported in the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (Carpenter and Pingali
2005).
In the mitigation scenarios, the most significant change compared to baseline is the
increased demand for land for bio-energy: from 3.9 million km2 in the baseline scenario to
9.3 million km2 in the 450 ppm CO2-eq. stabilization scenario. This means that the bio-
energy crop area is equal to about 50% of the total food and feed crop area in 2100. Most
of this land is located in the former Soviet Union, South America, and the USA and, in
the second part of the century, East Asia (see also Hoogwijk et al. 2004). In 2100, carbon
plantations occupy about 2.6 million km2 (about 5% of all forest at that time). Here, most
of the land is in the former Soviet Union, South America and again East Asia (Strengers
et al. 2007). It should be noted that the agricultural land area for food and feed crops
increases slightly, simply because some of the more productive areas are now used for either
bio-energy or carbon plantations. The total ‘domesticated’ area increases by nearly 20%
Table 4 Land use under the baseline (IMAGE 2.3 SRES B2 scenario) and mitigation scenarios in 2100
(million km2)
Baseline 650 ppm CO2-eq. 550 ppm CO2-eq. 450 ppm CO2-eq.
Agricultural land 43.5 44.7 45.3 45.6
Land for bio-energy 3.9 9.3 9.3 10.2
Land for carbon plantations 0.0 1.6 2.2 2.6
Total 47.4 55.5 56.7 58.3
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while, in the baseline, land use in 2100 is virtually equal to land use in 2000. Land use
does not differ much for the different stabilization scenarios as most of the bio-energy and
carbon plantation potential is also used as part of the portfolio for stabilization at less
ambitious levels. The question of whether the land-use consequences shown here lead to a
similar loss of biodiversity is a more difficult one. The area used for bio-energy production
and carbon plantations is mostly abandoned agricultural land (including both crop and
pasture land), with also a considerable area coming from natural grass land. In the former
case, at best secondary forest would have grown in these locations (although others have
pointed out that, in many cases, land is not likely to recover automatically, in which case it
will be transformed into degraded land). Moreover, it is to some degree possible to
combine biodiversity targets and carbon plantations. The impact on biodiversity, therefore,
is likely to be much smaller than the reduction suggested by looking at the land use
impacts alone.
6 Uncertainties in stabilizing emissions
In the discussion of existing literature in Section 2, it was concluded the there are several
categories of uncertainties that can substantially influence the results of stabilization
scenarios. Here, we will discuss two of these: the baseline scenario and specific assumptions
for individual technologies.
6.1 Reducing emissions from different baselines
Four scenario families were developed in the SRES report. Of these, the B2 scenario
represented the most medium development. The A1b and B1 families led to higher and
lower emissions respectively. Hourcade and Shukla (2001) showed the baseline to be just as
important for mitigation costs as stabilization levels. We have therefore explored the
influence of costs here on the basis of the implementation of these scenarios in the IMAGE
2.3 model. It should be noted that we have not included the A2 scenario. The reason is that the
storyline of this scenario, i.e. little international cooperation and little focus on environmental
issues, provides a very unfavourable situation for climate policy to be developed.
The A1b scenario leads to far higher per capita energy use than B2, although it has a
lower population level and a lower share of coal in total energy use. Total GHG emissions
are substantially higher than the B2 level, at around 26 GtC-eq. in 2050 and 25 GtC-eq. in
2100. The B1 scenario, by contrast, results in much lower energy use as a result of greater
efficiency and lower population levels. Here, total GHG emissions peak in around 2050 at
15 GtC-eq. and decline thereafter to 8 GtC-eq. in 2100. As a result, the emission reduction
objectives for the different stabilization levels are larger for the A1b scenario and smaller
for the B1 scenario (see also Fig. 3).
The costs of stabilization from these baselines for the low-range stabilization targets
explored in this study are shown in Fig. 8. As expected (based on the higher baseline
emissions), abatement costs for the A1b scenario are higher than those for the B2 scenario.
In fact, the NPVs of abatement costs for each of the A1b stabilization cases are about double
the costs of the corresponding B2 cases. By contrast, for B1, the costs of stabilization are
substantially lower. In addition, across the range considered here, costs rise more slowly for
B1 than in A1b and B2 as a result of a the smaller absolute gap between baseline emissions
and the emissions under the stabilization case, the high technology development rate and the
resulting lower marginal prices.
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6.2 Sensitivity to key assumptions for abatement options
Our analysis takes a wide range of abatement options into account. In all cases, the reduction
potential and costs are subject to considerable uncertainties. The long time scale used (100 years)
implies that assumptions need to be made about technology development, changes in im-
plementation barriers and fundamental changes in the system as a whole; these may either
assist or hinder certain reduction measures. As the uncertainties with regard to the individual
options pile up in our combined assessment, we have therefore performed a sensitivity
analysis for the 550 ppm CO2-eq. stabilizing scenario as indicated in Table 1. The results are
shown in Fig. 13.
In the case of emissions from the energy sector, one set of critical uncertainties include
factors like the rate of technology change, lifestyle, economic growth and population dynam-
ics. The impacts of these ‘storyline-related’ uncertainties have been explored earlier as part of
the influence of the baseline scenario (A1b and B1) and taken together could impact costs by
at least a factor 2. However, several other important uncertainties exist. As pointed out by
Edmonds et al. (2004), the development of hydrogen technology itself is not strongly
influenced by climate policy. However, once hydrogen is part of the system, stronger
reductions are feasible than without hydrogen given the fact that hydrogen can – at
relatively low additional cost – be produced without GHG emissions (Edmonds et al. 2004;
van Ruijven et al. 2006). In the analysis, therefore, we explored the impact of a scenario
with no hydrogen (a pessimistic assumption) and a scenario with large-scale penetration of
hydrogen. The sensitivity to these assumptions was found to be small in 2050 (as the
system hardly contains hydrogen) but substantial in 2100 (20% difference in abatement
costs either way).
Another important uncertainty concerns the potential of, and technology used for, bio-
energy. As shown by Hoogwijk (2004), the uncertainty relating to bio-energy supply results in
figures for potential use of between 100 and 800 EJ. In our central assumptions, the bio-















































































































































































































Fig. 13 Impacts of different uncertainties on global abatement costs as a percentage of GDP for stabilization
at 550 ppm CO2-eq, 2050 (left) and 2100 (right). The column total is restricted to those assumptions that
only impact the stabilization scenario; it therefore does not include the impacts of baseline and land-use
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case. Azar et al. (2006) have shown that including the option of bio-energy and carbon storage
(BECS) can reduce costs at low concentration levels by at least 50%. We will therefore use
BECS for the high end of our range (see also 6.3). Figure 13 shows that this is in fact a very
important uncertainty, influencing costs by about 40% downward (in the case of BECS) or 30%
upwards (in case of restricted bio-energy supply). The influence of BECS is relatively low in
long-run as the analysis is done for the 550 ppm stabilization scenario – for which the reduction
requirement in the long-run is still relatively low compared to the number of reduction options.
Another uncertainty relates to the contribution of energy efficiency. In the default run,
we assumed that the permit price and international emissions trading leads to a convergence
of investment criteria in energy efficiency worldwide towards levels that currently also apply
to energy supply. In our sensitivity analysis, these assumptions ranged from full convergence
towards supply-side criteria to no convergence. The influence of this factor is shown to be
relatively modest – and to influence costs in 2100 by about 10% either way.
The results show that the cost-optimal implementation of the stabilization scenarios
includes the large-scale use of CCS and nuclear power. For both options, not only tech-
nological uncertainties play an important role, but also social acceptability (for instance, at the
moment several countries have indicated not to build new nuclear power plants). In this
context, as a form of sensitivity analysis, we excluded both options (one by one). In each case,
2100 costs are about 10% higher. In 2050, the influence on costs is smaller. The reason for the
relatively small impact is that by excluding only one option, the electric power sector still has
enough reduction potential left to effectively respond to climate policy.
Another uncertain factor is induced technology change (in terms of investment costs) in
response to climate policy. This factor is described by learning curves in the default run for
solar, wind and nuclear power, bio-energy conversion, hydrogen production technologies,
production of oil, natural gas and coal and costs of energy efficiency. In another paper, we
showed that most of the ‘learning’ already occurs under the baseline scenario; the additional
learning that results from the investments induced by climate policy is (in most cases) smaller
than the baseline improvements (van Vuuren et al. 2004). In the sensitivity run, we set this
second factor, induced technology change, to zero, implying that technology change in the
mitigation scenario is equal to baseline development. While this factor is not important in the
short run, it still represents a major uncertainty in the long run (around 50% costs increase), as
shown in Fig. 13.
The effect of several crucial parameters that work directly on the supply and cost of
carbon sequestration through plantations has been examined in Strengers et al. (2007).
These parameters are the CO2 fertilization factor, the harvest regime, land costs, land use,
the establishment costs, the discount rate and the increased growth rates of managed trees
over natural trees (additional growth factor). Of these, the last factor proved to have most
impact on outcomes. If the additional growth factor is reduced by 20%, potential
sequestration by carbon plantations was found to fall by about 37% and average cost of
sinks increases sharply. On the other hand, an increase of 20% results in 33% more
sequestration potential and a cost decrease of 35%. Another important factor is the degree
to which areas suitable for carbon plantation can actually be used for that purpose. A
shortage of planting material, lack of knowledge and experience, other priorities for the
land (e.g., bio-energy), etc. may reduce the abandoned agricultural area that can actually be
planted. Waterloo et al. (2001) estimated that, in the case of CDM under the Kyoto
Protocol, only 8% of the potential area would actually be available. This number could
increase in time and with increasing permit prices. As a result, in our standard runs, we
defined an exogenous implementation factor equal to 40% of the total potential. In the
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sensitivity runs, this factor varied between 20% and 50% respectively. However, the impact
of these assumptions on overall global costs is relatively minor given the small contribution
of carbon plantations to the total portfolio of reduction measures (about 5% of costs increase
or decrease both in 2050 and 2100).
The non-CO2 reduction potential is based on the EMF-21 database and extrapolated for the
period up to 2100 on the basis of assumptions about technological developments, and
maximum reduction potentials and accompanying costs. Although there are uncertainties in the
2010 reduction potentials and costs, the major uncertainties are associated with the assumptions
about future development. The assumptions about the maximum reduction potentials have most
impact on the final outcomes. To assess this impact from a pessimistic perspective, we reduced
the reduction potential by 20% – and increased costs by 20%. In optimistic the case, we
assumed the opposite. We found that sensitivity of overall costs to the non-CO2 assumptions are
about 5%–10%, comparable to the sensitivity to the carbon plantation assumptions.
Land use represents another major uncertainty. It impacts our results in several ways:
(1) by influencing directly CO2 emissions from land use change, (2) by determining land
available for carbon plantations and (3) by determining land available for bio-energy. With
respect to CO2-emission-related changes in land use, it should be noted that even current
base-year emission levels are highly uncertain. Houghton (2003) estimated carbon
emissions at 2.2 GtC per year, with an uncertainty range varying from 1.4 to 3.0 GtC per
year. Future projections for the carbon budget vary even more given uncertainties in the
effect of CO2 fertilization, the response of soil respiration due to changes in climate and the
uncertainties in future land-use patterns (Gitz and Ciais 2004; Leemans et al. 2002;
Strengers et al. 2004). If we focus solely on the latter factor, future land-use change depends
on both socio-economic developments and technological improvements in the agricultural
system (Bruinsma 2003; Rosegrant et al. 2002). In the literature, there are different views
about the possibilities of technological improvement (MA 2006). To take these
uncertainties into account, we assessed the implications of uncertainties in technological
improvement by varying the achieved agricultural yields – and recalculating CO2 emissions
from land use change and the marginal abatement curves for carbon plantations and energy
(bio-energy). We took the yield increase of the least positive scenario in the Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment (order from strength) as a basis for the pessimistic run, and the yield
increase from global orchestration as the most optimistic option in the MA. This variation
provides an understanding of the importance of uncertainties in technological improvement
for land-use emissions and potentials for bio-energy and carbon plantations. The impact of
these assumptions on global costs is in the order of 5% –10% (in both directions).
We have not varied the other factors mentioned above for land-use related emissions
such as CO2 fertilization and other parameters that influence the carbon cycle. The carbon
cycle feedbacks are assumed at their IPCC TAR default values. It should be noted, however,
that latest insights seem to suggest that carbon fertilization might be substantially weaker than
assumed earlier. If that is the case, all greenhouse gas concentrations – in particular those for
the higher concentration levels – will shift upward. Or, by the same token, more abatement
action (and higher costs) will be needed to achieve the same stabilization level.
Discussed earlier in 6.1, Fig. 13 confirms that the baseline development is one of the
most crucial uncertainties determining overall costs. The overall sensitivity here is in the
order of 50% –100% (on the basis of the alternative B1 and A1b scenarios). The major role
played by the baseline assumptions is to be expected since it changes the overall reduction
objective, as well as technology assumptions, preferences for reduction options and GDP
levels (used here as the nominator of the cost indicator).
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In the last sensitivity runs, we combined all high-cost and low-cost assumptions (except
for baseline and land use). Variation was far higher than suggested by the individual options,
especially on the high-cost side. The reason is that, without CCS and nuclear power as zero-
carbon options in the electric power sector and with low bio-energy supply, this system is
much less amenable to substantial emission reductions. While in one-by-one sensitivity
analysis, the system has enough flexibility to substitute – in case all uncertainties play out in a
negative way, this flexibility disappears.
So summarizing, among the most important parameters in terms of sensitivity of stabi-
lization costs are the baseline, bio-energy, the presence of hydrogen, and the existence of
learning-by-doing. Other important uncertainties are future land use (agricultural yields),
bio-energy (the use of BECS), assumptions about efficiency improvement and, to some
degree, the availability of CCS and nuclear power. The combined effect of all parameters
can be far larger than the effect of individual options.
6.3 Possibility of stabilizing at even lower levels
In our analysis, we explored a set of scenarios that would lead to stabilization at levels as low
as 450 ppm CO2-eq. In the previous section, we showed that there are important uncer-
tainties in our analysis, some of which might lead to lower costs (and/or more reduction
potential). With the more optimistic assumptions, it would also be possible to stabilize at
lower levels than those explored in our central scenarios. Such scenarios will first overshoot
the target concentration (given all delays in the system) and only start to approach this
target by the end of the century. Of the uncertainties explored earlier, in particular more
optimistic assumptions for land use, efficiency and bio-energy (both the available potential
and the combination of bio-energy and CCS, BECS) could significantly increase reduction
potential and thus allow reaching lower stabilization levels. Here, we specifically explored
whether changing our assumptions for biofuels alone from the default assumption to the
optimistic assumptions that allows the combination of BECS could be enough to reach the
emission levels of a 400 ppm CO2-eq. The results, as indicated in Fig. 14, show that this
change alone is sufficient to reach the emission pathway. An important element here is that
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Fig. 14 Alternative scenario for stabilizing GHG concentration at 400 ppm CO2-eq. (left) and the associated
costs (right)
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stored underground. These net ‘negative emissions’ are in particular important for low
emission scenarios (see also Azar et al. 2006). The costs of BECS are a combination of the
biofuel costs and CCS costs, which makes this technology certainly attractive at the permit
price levels explored earlier for the 450 ppm CO2-eq. scenario. Thus, as a result of the more
optimistic assumptions, our overall costs are comparable to our default case but this
obviously requires conditions that allow for the achievement of this more optimistic view of
technology development. This illustrated by Fig. 14b, where abatement costs are plotted for
several stabilization levels both including and excluding BECS as abatement option.
7 Discussion
7.1 Important limitations of the current study
In this study, we used a linked set of integrated assessment models (TIMER, FAIR and IMAGE)
to explore scenarios that lead to low GHG concentration levels using a multi-gas approach.
There are a few important limitations to the study that are essential to interpreting the results:
& The cost concept used in this study refers to direct abatement cost only on the basis
of marginal abatement curves derived from underlying expert models – and does
not capture the macro-economic impacts of climate policy. Macro-economic cost
measures (such as consumption or GDP losses, but also sectoral impacts) might in
some cases be larger as they also include effects of loss of competitiveness, impacts
on fuel trade, combined effects of climate policy and existing taxes etc. On the
other hand, they can also be smaller, since there be will sectors and industries that
profit from climate policy and since there might be benefits from recycling the
revenues of carbon taxes (see Weyant 2000).
& The IMAGE 2.3 model does not explicitly model land use competition. For this
reason, we have restricted the potential land use for climate policy (bio-energy,
carbon plantations) to those areas that do not impact food production (i.e., abandoned
agricultural land and natural grasslands). It might be interesting to explore how
climate policy may impact food production in models that endogenously model
competition for land.
& Not all reduction options are included. For instance, in the electric power system, emissions
can also be reduced by geothermal power or concentrating solar power plants. However, as
such technologies will competemainlywith other zero-carbon emission options; we do not
think that including the new options will lead to significantly different results.
& The emission pathways are created by employing the FAIR-SiMCaP model that
uses a different climate model (MAGICC) than IMAGE 2.3. Considerable attention,
however, was given to making sure that the results of the two models were con-
sistent. The remaining differences (e.g., up to about 10 ppm for CO2 concentration)
are certainly within the uncertainty ranges.
& In view of this being a long-term study, many assumptions are beset with uncer-
tainty. This, for instance, is the case for assumptions on technological progress, and
reduction potential. This has been taken care by an extensive sensitivity analysis
(6.2).
& Finally, the most important limitation is that we do not deal with all kinds of societal
barriers that exist in formulation ambitious climate policies. Such barriers may
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include the specific interests of different actors, inertia in international negotiations,
other societal priorities etc. Instead, we assumed that all regions participate in climate
policy (without necessarily paying for it) from 2013 onwards. This allowed us to
explore, first, how ambitious climate stabilization strategies may look. In future
research, it will be important to explore further which barriers exists – and how these
may impact the results shown.
7.2 Comparing the results to other studies
As indicated in the introduction, there are hardly any other studies that describe mitigation
strategies for all GHGs at relatively low concentration levels. Comparison therefore has
to be made mostly on the basis of the CO2 concentration that is achieved in our scenarios
(instead of total GHG forcing).
In terms of mapping mitigation costs as a function of stabilization levels, the main com-
parisons that can be made are with the studies summarized in the IPCC Third Assessment
Report (TAR; these studies focus on CO2 only). Figure 15 shows the stabilization costs in
terms of the discounted net present value as a function of CO2 concentration levels on the
basis of this study, the TAR ranges and two more recent studies. Average cost values reported
in IPCC TAR are around 0.8, 1.3 and 6.4 trillion US$ for stabilizing at 650, 550 and 450 ppm
CO2 respectively (the lowest and highest values are typically 75% lower and two to three
times higher respectively). The corresponding values found in this study are 0.5, 1.7 and
8 trillion (interpolating our results to the rounded-off concentration levels on the basis of the
CO2 concentration in 2100). Our cost numbers, however, also include the mitigation costs
for reducing non-CO2 gases (about 20%–30%). Given our baseline emissions (following
the updated B2 scenario), and correcting for these non-CO2 costs, we can conclude that
values found (including the trend) are generally consistent with those reported for CO2
stabilization studies. Azar et al. (2006) and Rao and Riahi (2006) also discuss similar cost
levels as a function of concentration targets (again only for CO2) for considerably lower
levels (here we report the results of their study for model runs that include fossil fuel CCS).
Across the whole range of concentration levels, the function of costs as a function of lower
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Fig. 15 Cost levels in this paper
compared to alternative studies.
All studies report the Net Present
Value of mitigation costs (although
some differences may result using
different base years). The sources
of the data shown are: EMF-16 re-
sults (Hourcade and Shukla 2001)
(note that the EMF-16 results have
been summarized here in terms of
the highest and lowest values for
different concentration levels
across a range of models); IMAGE
2.2 (Azar et al. 2006; van Vuuren
et al. 2006) and (Rao and Riahi
2006). From the latter two studies
the data without the use of bio-
energy carbon capture and storage
are shown (to allow comparison)
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concentration level are comparable – although for individual concentration levels – costs
may differ over a factor five. Reasons that may cause different costs levels (between all
studies cited here) include differences in baseline, the number of options included and the
technology assumptions for these options and the type of models.
For multi-gas stabilization strategies, comparison can be made with the results of EMF-
21 (van Vuuren et al. 2006c; Weyant et al. 2006). With only a few exceptions, the results of
the models that participated in EMF-21 are only available for stabilization at 650 ppm CO2-
eq. In general terms, the findings described in this study seem to be consistent with those
found in the EMF-21 study in terms of the contribution of non-CO2 gases and overall cost
levels, but they extend them to lower levels. Given the wider range of abatement options
considered (among others, a larger potential to reduce non-CO2 gases, a larger potential for
carbon plantations, more possibilities to apply CCS), the marginal costs are lower than
those presented by van Vuuren et al. (2006b).
7.3 Dealing with uncertainties
Uncertainty plays a dominant role in determining relevant targets for climate policy. Climate
impacts are uncertain and – probably most importantly – climate sensitivity is very uncertain,
creating a range of possible temperature outcomes for different stabilization levels, as
indicated in Fig. 10. This paper has also shown that the potential and costs of several
mitigation options are subject to major uncertainties.
Designing climate strategies that can manage different types of uncertainties will therefore
be important. In this light, it is crucial to note that not all uncertainties are similar in nature. An
important difference is the lag time between impact, the time when the impact becomes
noticeable and the reversibility of the impact. It can still take decades before the uncertainty
related to climate impacts and climate sensitivity is significantly reduced. Moreover, once the
uncertainties are resolved (in whole or in part), the climate systemmay already be irreversibly
on a path of ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference’ because of all the delays. Most of the
uncertainties relating to mitigation options, however, are much more directly noticeable. For
instance, if costs develop less favourably for major mitigation options, mid-course cor-
rections can be made in either the portfolio of mitigation options used, the stabilization target
or the financial budget (policies will not, after all, be cast in stone for the next 50 or 100
years). Similarly, if certain options prove less effective, they can be removed from the total
package. There are some exceptions to this, however. One is that if a mitigation option leads
to lock-in effects, a change of course might be less easy to accomplish. Secondly, in theory,
CCS and nuclear power could lead to a situation of irreversible damage if the storage of CO2
or nuclear waste is not as safe as expected. In this light, what elements can be used to
establish strategies that can cope with uncertainties?
First of all, such a strategy will include elements of hedging against climate risk. As
described by Yohe at al. (2004), this in fact implies aiming in the short term for emissions
pathways that do not exclude the possibility of reach low stabilization levels, thus providing
options to avoid severe climate impact if climate sensitivity turns out to be at the upper
range of the PDF. Secondly, monitoring of the most crucial uncertain elements will be
important. Obviously, this particularly relates to parameters associated with temperature
increase and climate impact, but also to the costs and potential of mitigation options.
Thirdly, as much as possible, it will be necessary to select a portfolio of mitigation options
instead of only a few options. As shown in this paper, a portfolio is in fact the result of the
modelling that has taken place, but risk reduction is an additional argument not included in
the modelling itself. A fourth element is flexibility in targets. Here, obviously, there is a
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trade-off between providing enough long-term certainty to actors involved in climate
mitigation to make long-term investments attractive, while being flexible enough to deal
with resolving uncertainty.
8 Conclusions
The main issue addressed by this paper was to indicate what portfolio of measures could
constitute promising strategies for stabilizing GHG concentrations at low levels. The lowest
multi-gas scenarios currently discussed in literature look at stabilization at 550 ppm CO2-eq.
and higher. These scenarios have only a small change of limiting global mean temperature
change to 2 or 2.5 °C. The main purpose of the present article was therefore trying to
identify whether stabilization at lower concentration levels is feasible. Against this
background, we developed a set of mitigation scenarios for stabilizing atmospheric GHG
concentrations at 650, 550 and 450 ppm CO2-eq., and – subject to specific assumptions –
400 ppm. The scenarios focus on a larger set of mitigation options than most other studies,
and extend the lower range of multi-gas scenarios currently discussed in the literature. The
analysis leads to the following conclusions:
& The study shows that, technically, stabilizing greenhouse concentrations at 650,
550, 450 ppm and, under specific assumptions, 400 ppm CO2-eq. is feasible from
median baseline scenarios on the basis of known technologies.
In order to prevent ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate sys-
tem,’ the stabilization of GHGs at low levels (e.g., 450 ppmCO2-eq. or below) might
be needed. Currently, there are only a limited number of studies that identify miti-
gation strategies that could lead to such low stabilization levels – and none of these
are based on a multi-gas approach. Here, we show that there are sufficient technical
options to reduce emissions to the level required, and that these options can be
combined into effective stabilization strategies. In fact, under favourable conditions,
stabilization at 400 ppm is also within the realm of technical possibility.
For 650 and 550 ppm CO2-eq. stabilization, it is possible to develop strate-
gies that stabilize at these concentrations without overshooting the required target.
For 450 ppm CO2-eq., overshooting this level before returning to the target during
the twenty-second century seems unavoidable. For both 550 ppm CO2-eq. and
450 ppm CO2-eq. (and even lower levels), emissions have to peak within the next
two decades followed by strong emission reductions. Our calculations show this to
be the most difficult period for climate change policy, even assuming the full par-
ticipation of all countries under a climate regime. The costs of not peaking global
emissions within the next two decades could include higher temperature change and/
or more rapid emission reduction rates in the longer term (which can be costly if they
would require premature replacement of capital).
& Creating the right socio-economic and institutional conditions for stabilization will
represent the single most important step in any strategy towards GHG concentration
stabilization.
The types of reductions described in this paper will require major changes in the
energy system, stringent abatement action in other sectors and related large-scale
investment in alternative technologies. Moreover, we have assumed that the world
will find a mechanism to tap reduction potential in all parts of the world. In this
context, creating the right socio-economic and institutional conditions that enable
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these transitions will be more important than any of the technologies discussed. This
includes, among other things:
& Creating a sense of urgency about emission reduction in all parts of the world
in order to develop an effective global climate regime;
& Creating conditions for technology development, and more importantly,
technology dispersal and transfer;
& Overcoming current barriers to effective/cost-effective measures for reducing
GHG emissions (e.g., information to improve investment in energy efficiency).
The impact of socio-economic and institutional conditions can also be illus-
trated by our analysis of the impact of alternative baseline scenarios. While sta-
bilization at 450 ppm CO2-eq. represents a major challenge starting from the B2
baseline, the challenge is much smaller when starting from a B1 baseline.
& The net present value of abatement costs increases from 0.2% to 1.2% of the net
present value of GDP (5% discount rate) when moving from 650 to 450 ppm. On
the other hand, the probability of meeting a two-degree target increases from
0% –18% to 22% –73%.
In this paper, we have mapped out some of the costs and benefits of stabilizing
GHGs at low levels. Costs clearly increase for lower levels of stabilization, but so
do benefits. The net present value of stabilizing at 450 ppm CO2-eq. at our standard
assumptions are about 1.2% of GDP (accumulated over the century), but they reach
a peak of around 2% in the period 2040 – 2070. At the same time, stabilization also
provides clear benefits at low concentration levels. In order to achieve a certainty
(on average) of at least 50% in reaching a 2 °C target, the CO2-eq. concentration
needs stabilize at 450 ppm CO2-eq. or below.
In addition to direct abatement costs, stabilization also involves indirect costs and
benefits. There are, for example, the consequences for the fuel trade. Stabilization
policies are likely to reduce volume of global trade in fossil fuels, in particular oil and
coal. This will reduce the exports of some countries, but at the same reduce imports
of others. Regions that could export bio-energy may compensate some of reduced oil
export by bio-energy exports. CCS does limit the impact of climate policy on fuel
trade, especially for gas and coal.
& Strategies consist of a portfolio of measures. There is no magic bullet.
The reductions in our stabilization scenarios are achieved through a set of mea-
sures rather than a single measure. The reasons for this result include: (1) limitations
in the potential of individual options, (2) regional and subregional differentiation, (3)
increasing costs for penetration rates as a result of depletion, and (4) differentiation
between different sectors. In addition to these model results, there is another impor-
tant advantage of a strategy based on a portfolio of measures: the reduced risk if the
development of a single technology is slower than expected (or even this technology
is found unacceptable altogether, which could happen to nuclear power after a major
accident). There is also an important disadvantage: the dispersal of R&D capacity,
learning-by-doing and economies of scale. However, we feel that this disadvantage is
outweighed by the benefits mentioned above.
& Given our default assumptions, carbon capture and storage (CCS) represents a
very attractive technology to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
CCS could be the single most important technology for reducing CO2 emissions
from the energy sector given its relatively low current costs estimates (IPCC 2005)
compared to technologies that are chosen in the absence of climate policy. Its
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contribution could be around 30% – 40% of total CO2 emissions reduced in the
energy sector or 25% of total emission reductions. At the same time, the role
played by CCS can, if necessary, be replaced by nuclear power and/or additional
use of solar and wind power (at somewhat higher costs). It should be noted that these
options are subject to several uncertainties. CCS has still to be proven in large-scale
applications, and for CCS, nuclear power and wind power societal acceptance can play
an important role determining their real potential. (see also the sensitivity analysis)
Other important contributions to overall emission reductions (in the absolute sense)
under our default scenario include energy efficiency, the reduction of CH4 emissions,
bio-energy and nuclear power and solar and wind power.
& Stringent stabilization strategies do result in co-benefits but also in additional costs.
The systemic changes in the energy system induced by stringent climate policy
can result in important co-benefits. Emissions of regional air pollutants, in particular
SO2 and NOx, will be reduced substantially, leading either to the improvement of
regional and urban air pollution or to reduced abatement costs for these pollutants.
Another co-benefit is the likely positive impact of climate policy on energy security
issues (less dependency on oil imports). However, in addition to co-benefits, there
will also be additional costs. The most important is that stringent climate policies
are likely to lead to increased demand for land. This in turn could lead to impacts on
biodiversity and possibly even food security.
& Uncertainties are important.
Uncertainty constitutes an important factor in the development of stabilization
strategies, in particular with respect to the reduction rates required. In this paper,
we also focused on other sets of uncertainties relating to the effectiveness and cost of
mitigation options. These uncertainties are partly caused by uncertainty with respect
to technology development, but also by public attitudes (e.g., acceptance of nuclear
power, CCS or large-scale bio-energy). Together, these uncertainties can easily double
or halve the mitigation costs for a certain mitigation target, or even put certain targets
out of reach. Crucial uncertainties, for instance, include those related to land use, base-
line emissions, bio-energy use and potential and technology development. Climate
policies should therefore include strategies that can cope with these uncertainties.
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Appendix: model description
A brief description of the model – and how these models are connected is already included in the
main text. This appendix provides additional information – while for detailed model
descriptions, the reader is referred to model documentation which has been published elsewhere.
Description of the models used
The FAIR-SiMCaP 1.1 model
The FAIR 2.1 model (framework to assess international regimes for differentiation of future
commitments) was designed to quantitatively explore the outcomes of different climate re-
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gimes in terms of possible environmental and economic impacts (including emission trading).
It is a decision-support tool with at its core the option to design rule-based systems that
simulate different proposals for differentiating of future commitments (‘burden sharing’). The
model uses expert information from more complex models such as baseline emissions and
marginal abatement costs curves (in particular, TIMER and IMAGE) to calculate the con-
sequences of these proposals. The basic assumption of the model is that regions will reach
their emission reduction commitments on the basis of least cost – i.e., across different miti-
gation options (multi-gas) and across different regions (set by certain trading rules). Recently,
the FAIR 2.1 has been integrated with the SiMCaP 1.0 model allowing simultaneous calcu-
lations of climate impacts based on the MAGICC model (Wigley and Raper 2001) included
in SiMCaP. Extensive documentation of the FAIR 2.1 model can be found in den Elzen and
Lucas (2005) and FAIR-SiMCaP 1.1 model in den Elzen and Meinshausen (2005).
The TIMER model
The global energy system model TIMER (The Image Energy Regional model) has been
developed to simulate (long-term) energy baseline and mitigation scenarios. The model
describes the investments in, and the use of, different types of energy options influenced by
technology development (learning-by-doing) and resource depletion. Inputs to the model
are macro-economic scenarios and assumptions on technology development, preference
levels and restrictions to fuel trade. The output of the model demonstrates how energy in-
ensity, fuel costs and competing non-fossil supply technologies develop over time. In
TIMER, implementation of mitigation is generally modelled on the basis of price signals
(a tax on carbon dioxide). A carbon tax (used a generic measure of climate policy) induces
additional investments in energy efficiency, fossil fuel substitution, and investments in bio-
energy, nuclear power, solar power, wind power and carbon capture and storage. Selection
of options throughout the model is based on a multinomial logit model that assigns market
shares on the basis of production costs and preferences (cheaper, more attractive options
get a larger market share; but there is no full optimization).
The TIMER model has been described in detail (de Vries et al. 2001). The model includes
the following primary energy sources: coal, oil, natural gas, bio-energy, solar power, wind
power, hydro power, and nuclear power. In terms of secondary energy carriers, it includes direct
converted fuels based on the primary sources listed above and electricity, heat and hydrogen.
The IMAGE 2 model
The IMAGE 2 integrated assessment model describes important elements of the cause
(response chain of global environmental change and has been described in detail elsewhere
(Alcamo et al. 1998; IMAGE-team 2001b). In the model, socio-economic processes are
mostly modelled at the level of 17 world regions, while climate, land-use and several
environmental parameters are modelled at a 0.5 × 0.5 degree resolution. The models main
model components are the land-use and land cover model, a climate model and several
impact models (e.g., impacts on crops and soil degradation risk). The land-use and land
cover model distinguishes 14 natural and forest land-cover types and five man-made land-
cover types. A crop module based on the FAO agro-ecological zones approach computes
yields of the different crops and pastures, estimating the areas used for their production as
determined by climate and soil quality (Alcamo et al. 1998). In case expansion of agricultural
land is required to satisfy growth of food demand, a rule-based ‘suitability map’ determines
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which grid cells are selected. IMAGE also includes a modified version of the BIOME mode
(Prentice et al. 1992) to compute changes in potential vegetation. The climate model of
IMAGE (Eickhout et al. 2004) is an adapted version of the MAGICC model (Wigley and
Raper 2001); the carbon cycling modelling is integrated within the IMAGE’s detailed
description of the biosphere, and the ocean-carbon uptake is replaced by the Bern model
(Joos et al. 1996). Patterns scaling methods are next used to calculate climate change at the
level of a 0.5 × 0.5 grid. The modelling of land-use related greenhouse gas emissions in
IMAGE are based on detailed description of the physical drivers such as land use change
and animal production.
Table 5 Assumptions within the TIMER model for various energy categories
Option Assumptions References
Fossil fuels Regional resources and production costs for various
qualities; global trade (coal, oil and natural gas resources
equal 300, 45, and 117 ZJ respectively). Global average
crude energy prices in 2050 are 1.4, 5.1 and 4.4 1995US$/
GJ for respectively coal, oil and natural gas. In 2000, these




Regional reservoir availability and storage costs for various
options (different categories of empty oil, natural gas and
coal reservoirs, coal-bed methane recovery, aquifers). Total
capacity equals 1,500 GtC. Transport and storage costs






Power plant efficiency and investment costs for 20 types of
thermal power plants (coal, oil, natural gas, biomass)
including carbon capture and storage defined over time
(Hendricks et al.
2004)
Biomass Potential and costs for primary biomass defined by region
on the basis of IMAGE 2 maps (including abandoned
agricultural land, natural grasslands and savannah).
Primary biomass can be converted into liquid biofuels (for
transport) and solid bio-energy (for electricity).
Technology development is based on learning-by-doing.
Maximum potential equals 230 EJ in 2050 and 600 EJ in
2100. Production costs for liquid fuels varies between 16
$/GJ in 2000 and around 10 $/GJ (depending on scenario).
Production costs for solid fuels varies around 4 $/GJ
(Hoogwijk
2004)
Solar/wind power Solar and wind power based on studies that assess global
potential on the basis of 0.5 × 0.5 degree maps. Costs
change over time as a result of depletion, learning-by-




Nuclear power Investment costs of nuclear power based on available
information in literature (most important references
indicated). Investments costs are assumed to decrease over




Hydrogen Hydrogen modelled on the basis of production from fossil
fuels, bio-energy, electricity and solar power (including
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Specific assumptions on mitigation potential
In addition to the overall description of mitigation options in the main text, here we briefly
indicate some of the quantitative assumptions and detailed references.
a. Energy. The main assumptions in the energy model for the various energy categories
are indicated in Table 5.
b. Total marginal abatement curves
The total reduction potential per main reduction category is indicated in Table 6.
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